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Previous investigations on performance-related pay have mainly analyzed its 
relationships with earnings, productivity, and job satisfaction. Less attention has been 
devoted to the investigations of individuals’ preferences for the performance-related 
payment system per se and consequently the tradeoff between fixed pay and 
performance-related pay. In this paper, we first use a choice experiment approach to 
investigate the tradeoff between fixed pay and performance-related pay, and then link the 
tradeoff for each individual with their risk preferences. Our main results indicate that 
individuals’ preferences for the payment system per se and the magnitude of tradeoffs 
between fixed pay and performance pay are different according to their risk preferences. 
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1    Introduction 
Individuals are normally employed by firms under a variety of types of payment systems: 
fixed pay, performance-related pay, and payment combining fixed pay and performance-
related pay. The issue of effective performance and reward management has been a topic of 
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continuous research and discussion within the disciplines of personnel economics and human 
resource management (Baruch et al., 2004). In recent years, performance-related pay, either 
separated from or combined with fixed pay, has been much more widely used as part of the 
human resource policies of organizations, where the aim of this increased use has been to 
increase the output (e.g., number of products, quality of services, and revenues) from the 
input (both quantitative and qualitative) of employees. 
Support for performance-related pay is theoretically grounded in expectancy theory 
(Pearce and Perry, 1983) and reinforcement theory (Perry et al., 2006). Expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964) is predicated on a belief that individuals will exert effort if they expect it to 
result in an outcome that they value. In the case of performance-related pay, employees will 
work harder if they value monetary rewards and believe that such rewards will result from 
their increased efforts. Reinforcement theory posits a direct relationship between a desired 
target behavior (e.g., performance) and its consequences (e.g., pay). It suggests that pay can 
be used to create consequences for desired behaviors such as high performance that will 
reinforce the behaviors (Perry et al., 2009). 
Previous empirical investigations on performance-related pay have mainly analyzed its 
relationships with earnings (Booth and Frank, 1999; McNabb and Whitfield, 2007), with 
productivity (Lazear, 2000), and with job satisfaction (Green and Heywood, 2008; Heywood 
and Wei, 2006). Less attention has been devoted to the investigations of individuals’ 
preferences for the performance-related payment system per se and consequently the tradeoff 
between fixed pay and performance-related pay. We think this may be due to it being quite 
difficult to find a suitable and appropriate method to elicit individuals’ preferences for the 
tradeoff between fixed pay and performance-related pay. Therefore, the first motivation of 
this paper is to try to solve this preference elicitation problem by using a choice experiment 
approach, which is frequently applied in environmental economics, transportation economics, 
and marketing science. Our second purpose is to manifest the link of the magnitude of 
individuals’ tradeoff between fixed pay and performance-related pay to their risk preferences, 
because this is a natural extension of the study of performance-related pay but is seldom 
investigated in the related literature. 
Our analysis is based on data from a questionnaire survey conducted at Kansai University, 
Japan. In the survey, we used a choice experiment in order to elicit the tradeoff between fixed 
pay and performance-related pay. In the choice experiment, we do not directly observe the 
tradeoff, but only the respondents’ choices in certain situations. In the econometric analyses, 
we therefore apply a latent class logit model, which assumes that the population consists of a 
number of latent classes and the unobserved heterogeneity among individuals can be captured 
by these classes through estimating a different parameter vector in the corresponding utility 
function. Although we do not observe the tradeoff directly, we can estimate the tradeoff 
values for each respondent from the parameters estimated by this model. After the tradeoff for 
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each respondent has been estimated, we then examine its relationship with the risk 
preferences of each respondent. Note that the risk preferences of each respondent were also 
elicited from the questionnaire survey. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the survey 
and the econometric approach applied. In Section 3 we present the results from the empirical 
analyses, and finally in Section 4 we conclude the paper. 
2    Methodological Issues 
2.1    Survey 
In a choice experiment, individuals are usually asked to make repeated selections of their 
preferred alternative in the choice sets presented to them. In our survey, before the choice sets 
were presented, a hypothetical scenario relating to a job description was first provided to the 
respondents. The scenario includes the following: (i) each respondent is assumed to undertake 
a 5-hour part-time job of selling snacks at a local festival; (ii) the price of each snack would 
be 150 JP yen; (iii) the number of participants in the festival would be about 500; (iv) there 
would be no other shops selling snacks in the festival; and (v) each respondent can select their 
preferred payment system from the alternatives we provided. 
In each choice set, we provided three alternatives, named Payment A, Payment B, and 
Payment C. Each payment has two common attributes – hourly pay and pay per snack sold. 
Note that in our experimental design, the former corresponds to fixed pay and the latter refers 
to performance-related pay. The attribute levels considered for each payment type are 
provided in Table 1. As shown in the table, since the levels of the performance-related pay in 
Payment A and the fixed pay in Payment B are set to be always zero, Payment A and 
Payment B represent a pure fixed payment system and a pure performance-related payment 
system, respectively. In contrast, Payment C is corresponds to a combined payment system 
with both fixed pay and performance-related pay.1 
Table 1. Attributes and Their Levels for Each Payment System 
Attributes 
Levels of attributes 
Payment A Payment B Payment C 
Hourly pay (JP yen) 800/900/1000 0 500 
Pay for each snack sold (JP yen) 0 80/90/100 30/40/50 
                                                 
1 Although it is clear from the choice sets that Payments A, B, and C represent a pure fixed payment, a 
pure performance-related payment, and a mixed payment, we still applied these unlabeled names in 
order to avoid possible anchoring effects from the labels. 
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Concerning the issue of creating the choice sets in our choice experiment, a full factorial 
design was adopted and 27 (i.e., 33) choice sets were finally created. These choice sets were 
then randomly divided into 3 different blocks of choice sets, which were randomly allocated 
to the respondents. Each block consists of 9 choice sets. An example of a choice set is 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. An Example of a Choice Set 
 Payment A Payment B Payment C 
Hourly pay (JP yen) 900 0 500 
Pay for per snack sold (JP yen) 0 100 40 
Please choose one most-desirable 
payment plan by placing a  in a     
 
The survey was conducted between July and November 2013 at Kansai University, Japan. 
All the respondents were undergraduates at Kansai University. They were originally recruited 
to attend an economic experiment. After the experiment, they were asked to answer a post-
experiment questionnaire, the data of which are used for the present study. The questionnaire 
consists of the choice experiment questions mentioned above and several other questions 
related to their experimental behaviors and risk attitudes.2 The average time for answering 
this questionnaire was approximately 15 minutes. In total, 238 valid samples were collected, 
corresponding to 98 male and 140 female respondents. 
2.2    Econometric Model 
Choice models are based on random utility theory. The basic assumption embodied in the 
random utility approach to choice modeling is that decision makers tend to act as utility 
maximizers, i.e., given a set of alternatives the decision maker will choose the alternative that 
maximizes utility. The utility of an alternative for an individual (U) is modeled as the sum of 
a deterministic component (V ) and a random error term (ε ). Formally, individual q ’s utility 
of alternative i  can be expressed as: 
    iqiqiq VU ε+= .                                                            (1) 
Hence the probability that individual q  chooses alternative i  from a particular set J that 
comprises j  alternatives can be written as: 
                                                 
2 The experimental results are to be reported in another paper. 
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    ))(;())(;( JijVVPJijUUPP jqiqiqjqjqiqiq ∈≠∀−+<=∈≠∀>= 　　 εε .                (2) 
Converting the random utility model into a choice model requires certain assumptions about 
the joint distribution of the vector of random error terms. If the random error terms are 
assumed to follow the type I extreme value (EV1) distribution and be independently and 
identically distributed (IID) across alternatives and cases (or observations), the multinomial 
(or sometimes called conditional) logit (MNL) model (McFadden, 1974) is obtained. In the 
MNL model, the choice probability in Equation (2) is expressed as: 
    
=
=
J
j
jqiqiq VVP
1
)exp(/)exp( μμ .                                              (3) 
Then, making the further assumption that the deterministic component of utility is linear and 
additive in parameters, Viq β ′= Xiq, the probability in Equation (3) can be given as 
 
    
=
′′=
J
j
jqiqiq XXP
1
)exp(/)exp( βμβμ                                          (4) 
where μ  represents a scale parameter that determines the scale of the utilities, which is 
typically normalized to 1.0 in the MNL model; Xiq are explanatory variables of Viq, which 
normally include alternative-specific constants (ASCs), the attributes of the alternative i , and 
the social-economic characteristics of the individual q ; and β ′  is the parameter vector 
associated with the matrix Xiq. 
It is well known that heterogeneity among individuals is extremely difficult to examine in 
the MNL model. This limitation could be relaxed, to some extent, by interaction terms 
between individual-specific characteristics and various choices. However, this method is 
limited in that it requires a priori selection of key individual characteristics and attributes and 
involves merely a limited selection of individual specific variables (Boxall and Adamowicz, 
2002). One way of circumventing this difficulty is using estimation obtained from the latent 
class logit (LCL) model. The LCL model assumes that the population consists of a number of 
latent classes S and the unobserved heterogeneity among individuals can be captured by these 
classes through estimating a different parameter vector in the corresponding utility function. 
Formally, the choice probability of individual q  of class s is expressed as: 

=
′′=
J
j
jqssiqsssiq XXP
1
| )exp(/)exp( βμβμ   Ss ,...,1=                           (5) 
where sμ  and sβ ′  are class-specific scale and utility parameters, respectively. Then, in 
accordance with Boxall and Adamowicz (2002), Louviere et al. (2000), and Swait (1994, 
2007), the probability of individual q  in class s (Hqs ) can be expressed as: 
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1
exp( ) / exp( )
S
qs s q s q
s
H Z Zαλ αλ
=
′ ′=                                               (6) 
where α  is a scale factor typically normalized to 1.0, sλ′  is the parameter vector in class s, 
and qZ  denotes a set of characteristics (e.g., individual-specific characteristics) determining 
the classification probability. Combining conditional choice equation (5) and membership 
classification equation (6), the unconditional probability of choosing alternative i  is given as: 
 |
1 1 1 1
exp( ) / exp( ) exp( ) / exp( )
S S J S
iq iq s qs s s iq s s jq s q s q
s s j s
P P H X X Z Zμ β μ β αλ αλ
= = = =
   
′ ′ ′ ′= =                  (7) 
In equation (7), when we set sμ  and α  equal to one3, the parameter vectors sβ ′  and sλ′  can 
be simultaneously estimated by the maximum likelihood method to explain choice behavior.4 
    However, the LCL model cannot be estimated unless S (the number of classes) in 
equation (7) is given, because S is discrete but maximum likelihood estimation theory 
requires that the parameter space be continuous and estimates be in the interior of the space 
(Swait, 2007). Therefore, the central issue in the LCL model is how to determine S. The 
literature has recommended a number of information criteria for this purpose (e.g., Boxall and 
Adamowicz, 2002; Greene and Hensher, 2003; Louviere et al., 2000; Morey el al., 2006; 
Shen, 2006; Swait, 2007). Among these, four measures based on the log likelihood at 
convergence with s classes, sample size, and number of parameters are popular for 
determining S. These are defined as follows: 
      Akaike Information Criterion, *2(log )s sAIC L K= − −                             (8) 
      Akaike’s 2ρ , 2 01 [ / ( 2 log )]s sAIC Lρ = − − ⋅                                      (9) 
      Bozdogan Akaike Information Criterion, *3 2log 3s sAIC L K= − +                   (10) 
      Bayesian Information Criterion, *log ( log ) / 2s sBIC L K N= − + ⋅                   (11) 
 
where *log sL is the log likelihood at convergence with s classes, sK is the number of 
parameters in the model with s classes, 0L is the log likelihood of the sample with equal 
choice probabilities, and N is the sample size. 
                                                 
3 Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) note that utilizing the LCL model in empirical estimation requires all 
scale factors in equation (7) to be set equal to one. 
4 The parameter vector sλ′  in one of the latent classes must be normalized to zero (e.g., 1 0λ′ ≡ ) to run 
the estimation. Therefore, the remaining λ′ s are identified relative to this normalization. 
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    An alternative approach that can account for individual heterogeneity is called the 
random parameter logit (RPL) or mixed logit (ML) model; this model allows model 
parameters to vary randomly according to assumed distributions (e.g., normal, log-normal, or 
triangular) over individuals (e.g., Bhat and Gossen, 2004; Bjørner et al., 2004; Greene and 
Hensher, 2003; Hess et al., 2005; McFadden and Train, 2000; Revelt and Train, 1998; Train, 
1998). In this approach, each individual has their own set of scale and utility parameters. 
From this viewpoint, one could regard the RPL/ML model as the case where each individual 
in the sample can be considered as an individual class, which is indeed the LCL model with N 
(sample size) classes. In other words, the LCL model controls individual heterogeneity with s 
classes, where s is between 1 and N. Compared to the RPL model, there are two major 
advantages of the LCL model. First, the LCL approach is semi-parametric, so it does not 
require any specific assumptions about the distributions of parameters across individuals 
(Greene and Hensher, 2003). Second, the LCL model yields the probabilities in each class. 
This means that although each respondent is assumed to belong to one class, it is taken into 
account that there is uncertainty about a respondent’s class membership. 
3    Results 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results associated with the MNL/LCL specifications. All the results 
presented were analyzed by using NLOGIT 5.0, a specialist discrete modeling package in 
LIMDEP (Econometric Software, Inc.). With regards to the overall impression of the MNL 
and LCL estimates shown in Table 4, we find that compared to the MNL model, the 
goodness-of-fit measures (e.g., log-likelihood, Pseudo R2, and predictive power) are 
significantly improved by applying the LCL approach. 
Table 3. Information Criteria for Different Numbers of Latent Classes 
Classes Log-likelihood AIC 2ρ  AIC3 BIC 
1 -2089.32 4186.642 0.104825 4190.642 2095.982 
2 -1681.49 3380.989 0.277087 3389.989 1696.483 
3 -1448.64 2925.275 0.374527 2939.275 1471.953 
4 -1396.46 2830.913 0.394703 2849.913 1428.099 
5 -1390.98 2829.958 0.394907 2853.958 1430.949 
6 -1385.47 2828.939 0.395125 2857.939 1433.766 
3.1   Determining the number of latent classes 
As discussed in Section 2, the measures of AIC, 2ρ , AIC3, and BIC were applied to help 
determine the number of latent classes. We attempted various numbers of classes (1, 2, 3, 4, 
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5, and 6 classes) and summarize the statistics in Table 3. The log-likelihood values at 
convergence reveal that the greater the number of classes, the better the model’s fit is. This is 
not surprising, because log-likelihood values normally increase in magnitude when there are 
more parameters to be estimated (Shen and Saijo, 2009). From the measures of AIC3 and 
BIC, we find that the minimum values are in the 4-class model, suggesting that the 4-class 
model is optimal. Furthermore, although the minimum of AIC and the maximum of 2ρ  seem 
to support the 6-class model as the best solution, the improvement from 4 classes to 6 classes 
is so small as to be negligible. Therefore, we determined to select 4 classes for estimating the 
LCL models in this study. 
3.2   Results of the 4-class LCL Model 
    The estimated results of the 4-class LCL model are listed in Table 4. For comparison 
purpose, the MNL estimates are also provided. Two alternative specific constants (i.e., 
Payment A and Payment B) and two attributes (i.e., Hourly pay and Pay for each snack sold) 
were estimated as explanatory variables. Note again that Payment A and Payment B represent 
the pure fixed payment and pure performance-related payment systems, respectively. 
Table 4. Estimation Results of the MNL and LCL Models 
 
MNL 
LCL 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Payment A -0.6545**  7.9013** -0.9915 -5.6060*** -1.0971 
Payment B  0.6656* -1.0220  0.8821  2.6326**  4.0328* 
Hourly pay  0.0089***  0.0129***  0.0213***  0.0206***  0.0116*** 
Pay for each snack 
sold 
 0.0714***  0.1804***  0.1634***  0.1214***  0.0962*** 
Class probability   0.1332  0.3057 0.3668 0.1943 
Log likelihood -2089.32 -1396.46  
Pseudo R2 0.1065 0.4066 
Predictive power  50.27%  77.68% 
Observations 2142 2142 
Notes: Predictive power refers to the proportion of choices correctly predicted by the model. *, **, 
and *** denote that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Standard errors and z values are omitted to save space. 
 
First, look at the parameters of Payment A and Payment B. Compared to the MNL 
estimates, the LCL estimates help us achieve fresh insight into respondents’ preferences over 
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different types of payment systems. Based on the estimated signs and significances, about 
37% of the respondents (i.e., respondents in class 3) prefer the pure performance-related 
payment system and do not prefer the pure fixed payment system, relative to the payment 
system that mixes both fixed pay and performance-related pay. In contrast, about 13% of the 
respondents (i.e., respondents in class 1) and 19% of the respondents (i.e., respondents in 
class 4) favor the pure fixed payment and the pure performance-related payment systems, 
respectively, over the mixed payment system. Furthermore, the remaining 30% of the 
respondents (i.e., respondents in class 2) have no differences with respect to type of payment 
system. 
Concerning the estimated positive parameters of Hourly pay and Pay for each snack sold, 
we find that both are highly significant in all classes. This result indicates that the higher the 
pay, either fixed or performance-related, the happier the respondents are. Furthermore, based 
on these estimated parameters, we can calculate the values of the marginal tradeoff between 
fixed pay and performance-related pay for each class by dividing the latter parameter by the 
former. The values are calculated as 13.98 in class 1, 7.67 in class 2, 5.89 in class 3, and 8.29 
in class 4. It should be noted that the larger the value of the tradeoff, the more likely 
respondents are to prefer the marginal increase in the fixed pay. Therefore, from these class-
based values, it is clear that respondents in class 1 prefer the marginal increase in the fixed 
pay the most, and respondents in class 3 prefer the marginal increase in the fixed pay the 
least. It is worth noting that this evidence is consistent with that obtained from the specific 
alternatives. That is to say, on the one hand the respondents in class 1 prefer the pure fixed 
payment system to the other two, and thus they have the highest value of the marginal 
tradeoff; on the other hand the respondents in class 3 prefer the pure performance-related 
payment system to the other two, and thus they have the lowest value of the marginal 
tradeoff. 
3.3   Risk Preference and Individual Tradeoff Between Fixed Pay and Performance-
Related Pay 
    We asked the respondents to answer three questions relating to risk attitudes in the survey, 
aiming at eliciting their risk preferences. The detailed questions are provided in the Appendix. 
We categorized respondents’ risk preferences into risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving by 
the criterion that risk-averse is assigned by Q1 if the answer of Q1 is greater than 0.5, by Q2 
if the answer of Q2 is greater than 0.25, and by Q3 if the answer of Q3 is smaller than 0.5; 
risk-neutral is assigned by Q1 if the answer of Q1 is equal to 0.5, by Q2 if the answer of Q2 is 
equal to 0.25, and by Q3 if the answer of Q3 is equal to 0.5; and risk-loving is assigned by Q1 
if the answer of Q1 is smaller than 0.5, by Q2 if the answer of Q2 is smaller than 0.25, and by 
Q3 if the answer of Q3 is larger than 0.5. 
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By using the results of the 4-class LCL model and conditioning these on the individual 
choices, it is possible to obtain the values of the marginal tradeoff between fixed pay and 
performance-related pay for each individual. The mean individual tradeoffs categorized into 
the above-described three risk categories are presented in Figure 1. As shown in the figure, 
the mean individual tradeoff between fixed pay and performance-related pay decreases as the 
degree of risk-seeking goes up for all three questions. This is plausible because risk lovers are 
usually willing to sacrifice assured pay in order to pursue a greater possible reward; as a 
result, they are willing to accept a smaller marginal increase in the performance-related pay. 
We also conducted a two-tailed t-test for the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the 
mean tradeoff between risk averters and risk lovers. As a result, the null hypothesis is 
significantly rejected at the 5% level in Q1 (t = 2.225, p = 0.027, degree of freedom = 222) 
and 10% level in Q2 (t = 1.783, p = 0.076, degree of freedom = 186) and Q3 (t = 1.764, p = 
0.079, degree of freedom = 180), which provides supportive evidence that risk lovers are 
willing to accept a smaller ratio of performance-related pay to fixed pay. 
Figure 1.  
Estimated Individual Tradeoff Between Fixed Pay And Performance-Related Pay 
 
 
4    Conclusions 
The latent class logit approach allows us to estimate both the values of the class-based and 
individual-based marginal tradeoffs between fixed pay and performance-related pay. Our 
empirical results imply that respondents belonging to different classes have not only different 
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preferences with respect to the fixed payment and/or performance-related payment systems 
per se but also different values of the marginal tradeoff between fixed pay and performance-
related pay. In other words, individuals’ preferences for the payment system and the 
magnitudes of tradeoffs between different kinds of pay are different. This raises an important 
implication that firms or employers should design more-flexible payment systems to meet 
with their employees’ preferences for payment. However, this is very difficult to put into 
operation in the real world because firms or employers do not normally know their 
employees’ true preferences in advance. Our analysis on linking the values of the tradeoff 
between fixed pay and performance-related pay with risk preferences may be, to some extent, 
a shortcut to solve this problem. Our result suggests that risk lovers are more willing to 
choose a performance-related payment system and risk averters are more willing to choose a 
fixed payment system. Based on this, individuals’ preferences for payment systems can be 
elicited from their risk preferences, while eliciting risk preference is considered to be 
relatively easy. 
Appendix. Questions related to risk preferences 
 
Q1. There are two alternatives. Alternative 1 is that you will obtain 100 thousand JP yen with 
a probability of 100%. Alternative 2 is that you will obtain 200 thousand JP yen with a 
probability of (      ) %. Please fill in the parenthesis with a numeral so that these two 
alternatives have the same value to you. 
 
Q2. There are two alternatives. Alternative 1 is that you will obtain 100 thousand JP yen with 
a probability of 50%. Alternative 2 is that you will obtain 200 thousand JP yen with a 
probability of (      ) %. Please fill in the parenthesis with a numeral so that these two 
alternatives have the same value to you. 
 
Q3. When you go out, you will bring the umbrella if a (     ) % chance of rain is announced as 
the weather forecast. Please fill in the parenthesis with a numeral.  
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